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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Appellants, Saucon Valley Manor, Inc., and Nimita Kapoor-Atiyeh, appeal from 
the judgment of the District Court, urging that it erroneously denied their motion for a 
directed verdict and their post-trial motion to amend the verdict.  Appellants also appeal 
the District Court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Appellee, Julie Diaz.  The 
jury found that Appellants had discriminated against Diaz in violation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq.1  The jury also found that 
Kapoor-Atiyeh interfered with Diaz’s right to unpaid leave under the Family and Medical 
                                              
1 “The language of the PHRA is also substantially similar to [the ADA] provisions, and 
we have held that the PHRA is to be interpreted as identical to federal anti-discrimination 
laws except where there is something specifically different in its language requiring that 
it be treated differently.” Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
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Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
affirm.   
I.  Background 
a. Factual Background 
 Diaz was employed as a cook at Saucon Valley Manor in Hellertown, 
Pennsylvania from December 2007 until July 2010.  During that time she received 
several positive performance evaluations.  However, she also tested positive for alcohol 
during a random screening while at work on March 19, 2009.  She was arrested for 
Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) on June 27, 2009, which resulted in her placement 
in an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program (“ARD program”).  She also began 
attending Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings shortly after her DUI.  Moreover, 
Diaz recounted at trial that after her DUI, she “realized what a struggle it was going to be 
because [she] could not stop.”  A. 638a.   
 Diaz claimed that prior to her termination she told her direct supervisor, Cindy 
Fox, about the DUI, her struggles with alcoholism, and her desire to get help.  Ms. Fox 
corroborated this in her testimony.  Indeed, Ms. Fox’s employee review on June 8, 2010, 
indicates that she knew Diaz was having problems with something and planned to seek 
treatment.  A. 729a (“Like many of us, Julie has had personal issues in her life outside of 
work.  But she is a Fighter and is doing the right thing by getting help.”).   
 In June of 2010, Diaz was charged with public drunkenness.  As a result of this 
citation she was charged with violating the conditions of her ARD program. 
Consequently, Diaz was required to attend a hearing on July 22, 2010.  Diaz testified that 
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she told Ms. Fox that she could not work on July 22 because of the hearing.  Ms. Fox 
contradicted this testimony, claiming that Diaz did not inform her that she would not be 
at work.  The record indicates that Diaz was terminated on July 22 for, according to her 
employer, failing to call or show up for work.   
 Following the July 22 hearing, Diaz went to a rehabilitation facility from July 23, 
2010 to August 23, 2010.  Diaz testified that she called Ms. Fox immediately after she 
learned that she would be going to inpatient treatment.  Ms. Fox acknowledged receiving 
two notes on July 23 regarding Diaz, one of which informed her that Diaz would not be at 
work because she was in treatment.  The record contains a handwritten note dated July 
22, 2010 signed by Appellant Kapoor-Atiyeh.  The note reads: “If Julie Diaz does not 
show to work (we have heard outside rumors and she called [Ms. Fox and] said – public 
drunkenness doing a 28 day Rehab.)  Officially, she is terminated No FMLA applied for . 
. . Unofficially – we will discuss it.”  A. 733a.  
 Diaz was admitted to the Keystone Center in Chester, PA on July 23, 2010.  Upon 
arrival, she was immediately placed in an alcohol detoxification unit for a week.  She was 
not allowed any contact with anyone outside of the facility during that time.  She also 
testified that she experienced withdrawal symptoms.  The Keystone Center sent notice, 
dated August 13, 2010, that Diaz was receiving treatment at its facility.  Diaz claimed 
that she spoke with Ms. Fox a few times while in treatment, and during their last 
conversation on August 19, Ms. Fox informed Diaz that she had been terminated.   
b. The District Court Opinion 
1. Rule 50(a) Motion and Rule 59(e) Motion 
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 Appellants primary basis for appeal is Diaz’s failure to provide sufficient evidence 
or expert testimony to prove that she suffered from alcoholism.  Appellants pressed this 
argument several times below and in their motion for a directed verdict under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 50(a).  The District Court denied this motion from the bench.  In doing so, the 
Court specifically referenced Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2000), 
explaining that it did not think Marinelli stood for the proposition that Appellee was 
required to present expert testimony to prove that she had alcoholism.  Rather, the Court 
explained, the case says “you look at the EEOC regs and that the plaintiff can describe 
treatment and symptoms to allow a jury to determine if the plaintiff had suffered from a 
disability.”  A. 684a-85a.  The District Court elaborated on this point:  
We are not talking about evidence of some medical condition involving the 
central nervous system and nobody can pronounce the word and we don’t 
know what it means where we need an expert.  Alcoholism is a commonly 
encountered form of substance abuse in our society, and I think you look at 
the jury voir dire how many hands went up when they said there was 
alcohol abuse in the family.  There was a significant amount. 
 
A. 686a. 
 In denying the motion, the District Court further explained that it believed there 
was sufficient evidence for the question to go to the jury.  Specifically, the District Court 
noted that Diaz “had a DUI, she was in AA, she drank half a gallon of alcohol at night 
according to one exhibit.  She was in rehab for 28 days, she was in an ARD program 
related to her DUI.  The testimony of her husband, her brother and herself concerning her 
alcohol abuse.”  A. 685a.   
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 Importantly, the parties stipulated that “[a]lcoholism is a disability under the 
ADA.” A. 689a.  This stipulation relieved Diaz of having to prove that her alcoholism 
met the definition of a disability under the ADA, and instead, only required that she 
prove that she had alcoholism.2   Accordingly, this stipulation was included in the jury 
instructions regarding the first element of Diaz’s ADA discrimination claim, which read:  
With regard to the first element, the term disability means a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or any 
activity of central importance to everyday life, such as sleeping, eating, 
caring for oneself, speaking, thinking, and interacting with others.  The 
parties have agreed that if you find that Ms. Diaz suffered from alcoholism, 
alcoholism would be a disability under the ADA’s definition of that term.  
   
A. 555a. 
 These instructions were read without objection.  In addition to their argument 
regarding expert testimony, in their motion to amend the verdict pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 59(e), Appellants argued that Diaz failed to show that her alcoholism substantially 
limited a major life activity.  The District Court responded:   
Ms. Diaz needed to show only that she suffered from the medical condition 
of alcoholism.[]  Once the jury concluded that she had such a condition, it 
was required to find—based on the stipulation and pursuant to the jury 
instructions, which were read without objection—that she had a disability 
under the ADA. 
* * * 
[Appellants’] contention . . . contradicts the stipulation that unambiguously 
states alcoholism is a disability under the ADA.  
  
A. 7a-8a. 
                                              
2 The stipulation was made in exchange for Diaz’s agreement to forego a jury instruction 
on the alternate “regarded as” definition of disability.  SA 142 n.2; see also Appellee’s 
Br. at 30; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) & (3).   
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2. The Fee Award 
 
 In a separate opinion the District Court analyzed Diaz’s petition for attorneys’ fees 
and costs.  The District Court reduced Appellee’s award of attorneys’ fees from 
$445,248.00 requested to an award of $375,650.50.  The Court also reduced Appellee’s 
award of costs from $16,495.93 requested to an award of $9,514.06.  The District Court 
provided a thorough explanation of the reasoning behind these reductions.   
 The District Court began by explaining that Diaz, as the prevailing party on 
FMLA, ADA and PHRA claims, was entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.  See 
29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 12205; 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 962(c)(4)(c.2).  The 
District Court then sought to follow the Supreme Court’s direction that a “party must 
show that its fees are reasonable by submitting evidence ‘supporting the hours worked 
and rates claimed.’” A. 13a (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).  
Finally, the District Court noted that “[r]easonable attorney fees are determined first by 
calculating the lodestar, or the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a 
reasonable hourly rate.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).    
 The Court proceeded to outline its basis for determining that Appellee’s attorneys’ 
hourly rates were reasonable, which it defined as rates that “‘are in line with those 
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of comparable skill, 
experience and reputation.’”  A. 25a-26a (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 
n.11 (1984)).  These rates are considered the “prevailing market rates.”  The District 
Court relied on McGuffey v. Brinks, 598 F. Supp. 2d 659, 669-70 (E.D. Pa. 2009), for the 
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proposition that it could consider rates in and around Philadelphia to decide whether 
Diaz’s attorneys’ submitted rates were in line with the appropriate prevailing market rate.   
 The District Court concluded that “[t]he prevailing market rate, therefore, may be 
the Philadelphia market rate when a case is tried in Philadelphia because the attorneys 
practice within that district and litigants are located there.”  A. 24a.  As to Diaz’s 
attorneys’ stated rates, the Court noted that Appellee submitted three verifications, two 
from attorneys not involved in this litigation, which all assert that the challenged $400.00 
per hour rate of one of Diaz’s attorneys was reasonable. 
 Appellants also argued that Diaz’s attorneys’ hourly rates in this case amounted to 
a contingency fee multiplier.  The District Court gave this argument little weight because 
it had already determined that Appellee’s rates were equivalent to the prevailing market 
rate.  As such, according to the District Court, the fact that Appellee’s attorneys charged 
lower rates in other cases, was insignificant to the Court’s analysis.   
 
 
 
II. Discussion 
 
a. Proof of Alcoholism 
 
 We note, as an initial matter, that the parties stipulated that alcoholism is a 
disability under the ADA.  This relieved Diaz of having to prove that her alleged 
impairment of alcoholism met the definition of “disability” under the ADA by showing 
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that her alcoholism substantially impaired one or more major life activities.3  Instead, 
Diaz needed to prove that she suffered from alcoholism, which of course, Appellants 
contend she failed to do.    
 Appellants urge that the District Court should have granted their Rule 50 motion.  
Denial of a motion under Rule 50(a) is subject to plenary review.  “Such a motion should 
be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and 
giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient 
evidence from which a jury could reasonably find liability.”  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. 
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 In Marinelli v. City of Erie, we wrote, “the necessity of medical testimony turns on 
the extent to which the alleged impairment is within the comprehension of a jury that 
does not possess a command of medical or otherwise scientific knowledge.”  216 F.3d at 
360.  Relying on this proposition, the District Court concluded that “the jury was capable 
of concluding whether Diaz suffered from alcoholism without expert testimony.”  A. 9a 
n.7.  The District Court decided that the fact that Diaz tested positive for alcohol at work, 
was arrested for driving under the influence, was trying to stop drinking by going to 
outpatient treatment, drank every night after work, and was cited for public drunkenness, 
was sufficient for a jury to make a finding that she suffered from alcoholism. 4     
                                              
3 Under the ADA, a disability is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.”  42 U.S.C. § 
12102(1)(A).  The statute contains a non-exhaustive list of “major life activities,” which 
includes sleeping, working and caring for oneself.  Id. at (2)(A).   
4Appellants note that the District Court, in denying the Rule 50 motion on the record, 
mentioned evidence that had not been included as part of the record.  The District Court 
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 Marinelli is indeed the standard by which our district courts should determine 
whether expert testimony is necessary to prove a disability under the ADA, but in this 
case—because of the stipulation—the question is narrowed to what is necessary to prove 
alcoholism.  According to Appellants, the evidence upon which the District Court relied 
was not enough to prove that Diaz suffered from alcoholism because alcoholism is a 
complicated disease that must be diagnosed by a medical professional.  Appellants urge 
that what was described at trial evidences alcohol abuse, and that a lay person is not 
qualified to conclude that Diaz suffered from alcoholism based on that evidence.5  
                                                                                                                                                  
referenced, in front of the jury, that Ms. Diaz drank half a gallon of alcohol a day, which 
the Court later acknowledged was evidence that was not presented to the jury.  The Court 
determined that there was still sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that 
Diaz suffered from alcoholism.  We agree, and therefore, view this error as harmless.   
 
5 What is the difference between alcoholism and alcohol abuse?   
Alcohol abuse is a pattern of drinking that results in harm to one’s health, 
interpersonal relationships, or ability to work.  Manifestations of alcohol abuse 
include the following: 
• Failure to fulfill major responsibilities at work, school, or home. 
• Drinking in dangerous situations, such as drinking while driving or 
operating machinery.  
• Legal problems related to alcohol, such as being arrested for drinking while 
driving or for physically hurting someone while drunk.  
• Continued drinking despite ongoing relationship problems that are caused 
or worsened by drinking.   
• Long-term alcohol abuse can turn into alcohol dependence.   
Dependency on alcohol, also known as alcohol addiction and alcoholism, is a 
chronic disease.  The signs and symptoms of alcohol dependence include— 
• A strong craving for alcohol. 
• Continued use despite repeated physical, psychological, or interpersonal 
problems.  
• The inability to limit drinking.   
Appellants’ Br. at 25 n.3. (quoting literature from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention). 
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Furthermore, Appellants conceded at oral argument that they are not advocating for a 
strict rule requiring expert testimony or medical diagnosis to prove alcoholism, but, 
rather, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove Diaz suffered from 
alcoholism.  We disagree. 
 We find no basis to disturb the jury’s findings.   See Abrams v. Lightolier, 50 F.3d 
1204, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A jury verdict will not be overturned unless the record is 
critically deficient of that minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might 
reasonably afford relief.”).  The fact that Diaz had a DUI, drank every day, was unable to 
stop, tested positive for alcohol at work, and went to a 28-day inpatient treatment facility 
experiencing withdrawal while there, could be enough for a rational juror to conclude that 
she suffered from alcoholism.   
 In our view, the stipulation was a concession made for tactical reasons—see supra 
n.2—and it presents such a unique circumstance that, in this context, we find no need to 
follow the holdings of some state courts and adopt a rule requiring medical testimony to 
prove alcoholism as a matter of federal law. 6  Indeed, in most, if not all, ADA cases 
                                              
6 Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 806 (N.J. 1988) (“Given the complexity of 
the many diagnostic procedures involved, expert medical testimony is required to 
establish the fact of the employee’s alcoholism.”); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., v. Dep’t of 
Industry, Labor & Hum. Rel., 273 N.W.2d 206, 212-13 (Wis. 1979) (“Alcoholism is a 
disease.  Its diagnosis is a matter of expert medical opinion proved by a physician and not 
by a layman.”); Babcock & Wilcox Co., v. Ohio Civ. Rights Com’n, 510 N.E.2d 368, 369-
70 (Ohio 1987) (“Something more than the self-serving testimony of the person claiming 
the handicap might be needed to demonstrate an otherwise hidden disability.”); Greater 
Cleveland RTA v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm’n, 567 N.E.2d 1325, 1327 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1989) (“There must be, at a minimum, medically qualified evidence to support a finding 
that a person is an alcoholic.”).   
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involving alcoholism, a plaintiff still must prove that her alcoholism substantially limited 
a major life activity.  Based on these facts, we have no occasion to consider whether Diaz 
met this burden because the stipulation relieved her of having to establish any substantial 
limitation.    
b. The Fee Award 
 
 Appellants argue, as their final basis for appeal, that the District Court erred in its 
award of attorney’s fees.  Appellants urge remand in light of the District Court’s use of 
an allegedly improper community market rate in calculating the lodestar.  While we 
review de novo the legal standards applied to an award of fees, we review the 
reasonableness of the award for abuse of discretion.  Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 
F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2001).  We have cautioned against disturbing a district court’s 
decision of the reasonable hourly rate, unless it is clearly erroneous.  Interfaith 
Community Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (“ICO”).   
 Under the FMLA and the ADA, a prevailing party is entitled to reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and costs.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) (“The court in such an action shall, 
in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee, 
reasonable expert witness fees, and other costs of the action to be paid by the 
defendant.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (“In any action . . . the court or agency, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation 
expenses, and costs . . . ”).  
 In ICO, we stated that this Court, and our lower courts, should apply the “forum 
rate” rule in determining an attorney’s reasonable rate subject to two exceptions, neither 
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of which is applicable in this case. 7  426 F.3d. at 705.  The objective of the forum rate 
rule is to assist a court in defining the relevant prevailing market that establishes the 
reasonable rate.  As adopted by this Court, the rule dictates that an attorney’s rate should 
be set based on the prevailing community market rate where the suit is litigated.8  Id.  
 Appellants insist that the District Court should have applied a rate that was 
district-wide or averaged the varying market rates across the entire Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  We disagree.  We perceive no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s 
decision to apply Philadelphia market rates to a case that was filed and tried in 
Philadelphia. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court. 
 
                                              
7 The two exceptions are “when the need for special expertise of counsel from a distant 
district is shown or when local counsel are unwilling to handle the case.”  ICO, 426 F.3d 
at 704 (citing Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 
108 F.R.D. 237, 261 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
8 In determining the prevailing rate for a particular attorney, a court should consider the 
relevant community rates for similar services by a lawyer of reasonably comparable skill 
and experience.  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990).  
